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Abstract
In the context of the needs of the Semantic Web and Knowledge Management, we consider what the requirements are of on-
tologies. The ontology as an artifact of knowledge representation is in danger of becoming a Chimera. We present a series of
facts concerning the foundations on which automated ontology construction must build. We discuss a number of different func-
tions that an ontology seeks to fulfill, and also a wish list of ideal functions. Our objective is to stimulate discussion as to the real
requirements of ontology engineering and take the view that only a selective and restricted set of requirements will enable the beast to fly.
1. Introduction
It has been widely accepted that one of the major chal-
lenges for the Semantic Web is to efficiently and effectively
construct ontologies (McGuiness, 2003). How this will be
done is a function of many different factors. Just as every
bridge built by a civil engineer is different depending on the
width of the river, the ground on each side, the size of the
bridge and a myriad of other factors, so in constructing on-
tologies there are many ways to set about it each with their
own consequences.
Artificial Intelligence has a long tradition of narrowing
down problems to such an extent that while on the one hand
they become possible to implement, the solutions are of-
ten of value only in a limited sphere. This is true whether
we look at microworlds or expert systems. This is exactly
one of the challenges for which ontologies are supposed to
be a partial solution. Ontologies are the core representa-
tional medium for knowledge in the Semantic Web. How-
ever, ontologies have been sold to the research community
as a panacea, a remedy for all things for all men. For ex-
ample, we find the word “ontology” being used to describe
taxonomies such as those of Yahoo, lexical databases such
as WordNet, and logically coherent constructs over which
reasoning systems can operate (like FaCT, Racer, etc. Hor-
rocks 1998, Haarslev and Mo¨ller 2001)
Rather than going over the somewhat philosophical is-
sues as to what an ontology is or rather what it ought to
be, in this paper we will enumerate a number of potential
requirements and consider their ramifications. We will ar-
gue that not all of them can be satisfied at the same time,
because in effect we are dealing with a beast that, like the
mythological Chimera of the Ancient World, is expected to
be a multiplicity of animals (cf Figure 1). Such a beast is
unreal.
To continue our metaphorical excursion, we can con-
ceive of the task of building ontologies from the perspec-
tive of civil engineering. We can consider what our foun-
dations are and what materials we have to build with. We
can consider the intended construction and its contradictory
requirements. I will leave it as an exercise for the reader to
develop the necessary tools to take us from foundations to
delivery.
Figure 1: The Chimera of Arezzo
2. The Foundations
The geology of knowledge is in flux An ontology is
a model, a representation of knowledge. However, that
knowledge which we try to model is in a continuous state
of change and thus in many cases (depending on the scope
of the ontology) the model is out of date from the moment
of completion. This ever more true the larger the size of
an ontology, and consequently we see large hand built on-
tologies continuously being revised (e.g. the Gene ontology
Gene Ontology Consortium 2005), often with quite radical
changes. If our purpose were merely to capture an image,
or record the state of knowledge at a given time, it would
be a less complex task. But what we want is to represent
knowledge so as to do things with that representation so
there needs to be a level of analytical detail much like an
outstanding architectural model of a planned building.
When one says knowledge is in flux this means a num-
ber of things. At a simple level new concepts or new ideas
are added to the body of knowledge. At a more complex
level, new ways of analysing existing concepts or items in
the world arise. In the 20th century four models of knowl-
edge were articulated which have implications on how we
view ontologies. First, there is the traditional positivist
view of knowledge, where each discovery is added to the
overall construct. In this view of knowledge, an ontology
would be monolithic and change would only occur at the
edges as new items are added. There would be no need for
internal change. Secondly, in the Popperian view of knowl-
edge (Popper, 1959), an ontology would reflect a theory
about the world which would in effect be tested continu-
ously so that whenever it was proved wrong a new theory
(in our case a new ontology) would need to be constructed.
A third view was that of Thomas Kuhn, who believed that
theories of knowledge fit into ‘paradigm’ or ‘disciplinary
matrix’ reflecting the common consensus at a given time
(Kuhn, 1962). As new discoveries are made so there is a
fraying at the edges until eventually a revolution is trig-
gered an an entirely new theory has to be provided. Models
of knowledge from different paradigms are ‘incomesurate’
which means there is no way to compare them or evaluate
one with respect to another because the meaning of basic
terms or concepts is affected by the theories they are em-
bedded in. Finally there is the view of Quine who believed
that knowledge is like a ‘force field’ and as things change at
the edges so this has a knock on effect throughout the sys-
tem sometimes triggering minor sometimes major changes
in the internal structure (Quine, 1951). In such a case an
ontology would need to be designed to be continuously re-
structured in its internal form depending on the changes
along the periphery.
Clearly our traditional conception of ontologies appears
to fit the positivist monolithic approach. Certainly such is
the case of ontologies like Cyc (Lenat et al., 1994). The
problem for ontology construction is that one of the other
theories is certainly closer to the real progression of human
knowledge, although it is doubtful whether these philo-
sophical perspectives actually capture the real complexity.
Human labour is expensive. Excavating knowledge by
hand from the substrate of human artifacts (whether a col-
lection of minds or texts) is extremely costly. It is costly
in time, it is costly in financial terms and it is very error
prone. It has consequently been a foundational tenet of on-
tology building that we must automate the task ideally in
its entirety. The reality has been that the extent of automa-
tion has been proportionate to the triviality of the knowl-
edge acquired by software systems. Thus for example a
system like Knowitall can identify that a biologist is a sub-
class of scientist[REF]. So can a human being, faster, more
easily and cheaply. What Knowitall can claim is to finding
many instances of cities which are not present in a standard
gazetteer. The issue is to identify where human labour is
necessary and where it is most effective.
Knowledge is abstract, text is concrete. We need to re-
member that we cannot read human minds. We cannot di-
rectly draw on the accumulated knowledge of either an in-
dividual or a community. An ontology as a form of knowl-
edge representation is an abstract model of what we individ-
ually or collectively believe is true about the world and the
actors in it. Our only concrete source of information in this
regard is text in that we can analyse texts on a computer,
manipulate them and extract certain types of information
from them.
Our dependence on text has its advantages and disad-
vantages. On the positive side, we have now over a gen-
eration of research in text analysis and computational lin-
guistic methods to draw on and exploit. There are large
quantities of text whether in specific corpora or on the Inter-
net. The existence of the Internet, however, provides both a
challenge and an opportunity in that while it is an almost in-
finite resource, it is very repetitive, unreliable and ambigu-
ous. When what is needed is an ontology of a given do-
main, what is not needed are texts using the same terms in
an entirely different domain. There is also the problem that
in effect the visible web is only the tip of the iceberg and
we would like ways of accessing the knowledge available
in the Deep Web. Surely a great deal of relevant knowledge
is stored in its deeper manifestations. This is all the more
relevant when we consider the next foundational issue.
The implicit nature of text. The greatest problem with
extracting knowledge from text is that a large proportion
of what we need to identify is not in fact explicitly stated
in the text. As we have argued elsewhere (Brewster et al.,
2003), a text is an act of knowledge maintenance. In writ-
ing a text, each and every author assumes a shared set of
concepts, ideas and terms of reference. This is inevitable
otherwise communication could not arise. A given text in-
teracts in specific ways with this assumed ontology. First,
it re-enforces the assumptions of that background knowl-
edge by telling the reader which ontology to use to process
the text. Secondly, the text alters the links, associations and
instantiations of concepts already present in the ontology.
Thus a primary purpose of a text at some level is to change
the relationship between existing concepts, or change the
instantiations of those concepts. Finally, a text may affect
a domain ontology by adding new concepts to the existing
domain ontology.
In each case, however, a text takes the background
knowledge, in effect the background ontology for granted.
Texts rarely make explicit statements concerning the ontol-
ogy. In Quinean terms, texts alter our knowledge of the pe-
riphery; they do not make explicit statements about the core
of knowledge. This may seem strange but it is inevitable
given the nature of communication. The engineering con-
sequences are substantial however:
1. It means we cannot expect from a given domain spe-
cific corpus of texts to derive the underlying ontology
because at nearly every step of the way that ontology
is assumed.
2. It means we need to find techniques round the tacit
manner in which knowledge is expressed.
3. We need to establish coherent methods for going out-
side the corpus to identify the missing knowledge.
4. The search for explicit knowledge must be focussed on
that which is actually needed, i.e. no need to relearn
basic ontologies.
3. The Construct
We can identify certain specific roles that this strange
modern beast, an ontology, is required to play. In enumer-
ating these, no attempt is made to claim that they are com-
patible with each other and we believe in fact that this is a
significant issue as to which requirements should take pri-
ority in any given construction effort. We begin first with
a brief wish list1 and then move on to certain functions of
ontologies.
1Pace Donald Rumsfeld http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Rumsfeld
3.1. The Wish List
Ontologies should represent things we know we know.
Most ontologies of various shapes and sizes which have
been created up to now try to represent the knowledge that
we all think we know we know. One aspect of this is that for
any given community an ontology is supposed to represent
its “share conceptualisation” (Gruber, 1993) so inevitably
an ontology reflects shared agreement, what Kuhn would
have called the ‘paradigm’. Thus we find that Cyc has at-
tempted to capture commonsense knowledge i.e. what we
all agree about (Lenat et al., 1994). Similarly the editors
of the Gene Ontology wish to create “consistent descrip-
tions” for their field. This is only possible if there is wide
agreement on what is known and what it is called. These
efforts are eeriely reminiscent of the (unsuccessful) seekers
for a universal language in the late medieval and renais-
sance time (Rossi, 2000).
There has been an unfortunate tendency in ontology en-
gineering to develop quite complex software systems which
produce relatively trivial output (cf. Navigli and Velardi
2004, Cimiano et al. 2004, Etzioni et al. 2004). Complex al-
gorithms are written, resources are trawled, and many texts
analysed to determine that, for example, a ferry service isa
boat service. The question arises whether this is the foun-
dation of something much larger or whether these systems
will never be able to break out of limited domains. If the
latter, where does the bottleneck lie?
Another issue is the extent to which ontologies should
represent only that which is thoroughly understood. Given
the logicist tradition in AI, and its effect through Descrip-
tion Logics on ontology engineering, there is a danger
that our representation of the world will only reflect that
which is understood sufficiently from a logical perspective
(cf.below).
Ontologies should make accessible things we know we
don’t know. Some of the major intended tasks for on-
tologies both in the arena of the Semantic Web and Knowl-
edge Management is to act as vehicle for knowledge re-
trieval (Schraefel et al., 2004). This is an explicit aim in the
Gene Ontology and clearly this is the most obvious func-
tion of ontologies/taxonomies such as Yahoo or the Open
Directory (www.dmoz.org). Possibly the most effective
demonstration of the potential of using a form of ontol-
ogy is to be found in the work of Hearst on the Flamenco
project where great emphasis has been placed on allowing
the metadata to facilitate exploratory search (Hearst et al.,
2002; Yee et al., 2003).
Another manner in which ontologies allow us, or should
allow us to access things we know we don’t know is in on-
tology population. This is in effect a form of Information
Extraction (Ciravegna and Wilks, 2003) and Etzioni et al.
(2004) give a typical successful example in finding a mul-
titude os cities absent from a standard gazetteer. However,
there is another sense that an ontology must make knowl-
edge accessible which is to allow the identification of rela-
tions between objects which we did not know existed. Let
us imagine we know about subject x and subject y but so far
we have been unaware of any impact, relationship of effect
of one on the other. An ontology should provide a means of
representing or inferring this type of knowledge. The real
issue is where this sort of knowledge comes from, and given
that everything is potentially related to everything else, how
this knowledge can be evaluated as of significance.
Ontologies should make accessible things we don’t
know we don’t know. The greatest challenge lies in iden-
tifying knowledge which we do not know we do not know.
This is a major practical problem in many cases where there
is an open ended continuous input of textual data. For
example, there are people employed by the Environment
Agency (UK) whose job it is to identify new threats to the
environment. In effect, they do not know what they do not
know, because threats to the environment can arise from a
multitude of origins which are unpredictable. Similar situ-
ations arise in economic analysis or security intelligence.
It is an open question whether we can construct systems
which will allow the spotting of unknown unknowns. We
can conceptualise this as shown in Figure 2. There is an ex-
isting ontology or body of knowledge (the known known).
There is an unknown ontology (it may be unknown for ex-
ample because until now it has been considered irrelevant)
- this is the unknown unknown. There is a connection, an
impact, an effect of items in the unknown ontology on the
known.
Figure 2: Conceptualising the unknown unknown
Knowledge is normally acquired by following a thread,
one thing leads to another. The fundamental question to ask
here is whether this is the only way to discover knowledge
(in our practical context) or whether we can envisage other
more creative and dynamic means.
3.2. Functions of an Ontology
A simplistic view would say that an ontology is a model
of the world which can be used to reason about it. However,
there is a whole range of functions, assumptions and aspi-
rations encoded in a given type or instance of an ontology.
Following Davis et al. (1993), we consider five functions,
or rather let us say five animals which an ontology tries to
embody.
An ontology is a surrogate. Intelligent entities go
through processes of reasoning about the world, often in
order to plan actions. The reasoning involves internal rep-
resentations but the objects reasoned about are usually ex-
ternal, outside in the world. Consequently the ontology or
knowledge representation is surrogate standing for the ob-
jects outside in the world. The correspondence between
the surrogate or knowledge representation is the semantics.
The ‘fidelity’ of the correspondence depends on what the
knowledge representation captures from the real thing and
what it omits. Perfect fidelity is impossible. Two important
consequences are that every ontology must unavoidably lie
even if it is merely by omission, and that all forms of rea-
soning about the world will reach false conclusions at some
stage. The soundness of the reasoning process cannot avoid
this because the representation is in some way incorrect. It
is essentially a practical engineering decision to find ways
minimising the the errors given the specific task at hand.
There are further consequences. Firstly one of the ma-
jor claims for ontologies is that they will facilitate the in-
terchange of knowledge between (for example) agents, or
the reuse in different systems. However, if each agent or
system has an imperfect model of its universe, knowledge
interchange or sharing may increase or compound errors
which were not visible in the initial use of an ontology.
Second, and closely related, ontologies of the same domain
will inevitably model different aspects of the external world
depending on the focus and assumptions of the ontology’s
authors.
A Ontology is a set of Ontological Commitments. This
may appear tautological but the choice of ontology is also
a “decision about how and what to see in the world” (Davis
et al., 1993, :19). This is both unavoidable because rep-
resentations are imperfect and useful because it allows the
representation to focus on that which the representation’s
author considers relevant or interesting. They see these
choices as allowing us to cope with the overwhelming com-
plexity and detail of the world. Consequently it is the con-
tent of the representation i.e. the set of concepts chosen and
their inter-relation which provides a particular perspective
on the world. The choice of notation (logic, LISP, or OWL)
is unimportant.
It is interesting that, with respect to ontologies, an im-
mense amount of effort has been expended in develop-
ing and defining ontology representation languages, and
in contrast relatively little effort has been made to analyse
what ontological commitments particular ontologies make.
The only exception to this has been Guarino’s critique of
structures such as WordNet for not conforming to a logi-
cian’s world view in terms of consistency and logical rigour
(Guarino 1998; Gangemi et al. 2001 but cf. Wilks 2002).
An inherent assumption of the all authors in this field is
that ‘concepts’ are the key building blocks, and we manip-
ulate concepts with words. All ontologies I have encoun-
tered use words to represent the concepts and to mediate or
provide a correspondence with the external world. Conse-
quently a large range of items in the world or experiences
which do not lend themselves readily to verbal expression
cannot be modelled. We could describe this as the ‘Onto-
logical Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis’ i.e. that that which cannot
be captured by words cannot be represented in an ontology.
An Ontology or Knowledge Representation is a Frag-
mentary Theory of Intelligent Reasoning. The way a
knowledge representation is conceived reflects a particular
insight or understanding of how people reason2. The select-
2The very use of a representation is a commitment to symbolic
AI or what Haugeland call “Good Old Fashioned AI” (Haugeland,
1985, :112ff.).
ing any of the currently available representation technolo-
gies (such as logic, frames, knowledge bases, or connec-
tionism) commits one to fundamental views on the nature of
intelligent reasoning and consequently very different goals
and definitions of success.
The OWL language which has been developed by the
W3C consortium as a standard language for describing
ontologies for the Semantic Web comes in three flavours
(http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL/). The existence
of these three flavours reflects the differing traditions that
have merged in the current effort to construct a standard.
This does not diminish the point that by choosing a specific
form of knowledge representation, there is a commitment
to specific views about the nature of intelligence. After all
Minsky himself in his original paper on frames noted that
his work was a ”partial theory of thinking” (Minsky, 1975)
and so equally there are limits and presumptions in a stan-
dard like OWL which have not been fully spelled out but of
which the ‘flavours’ are an indication. Minsky himself has
taken a very humble view, stating in an interview, “I want
AI researchers to appreciate that there is no one ‘best’ way
to represent knowledge. Each kind of problem requires ap-
propriate types of thinking and reasoning – and appropriate
kinds of representations” (Minsky and Laske, 1992). This
comment should raise many questions as to the longer term
viability of a standardisation approach like that of the Se-
mantic Web community with OWL and the successful use
of a limited range of knowledge representations.
An Ontology is a Medium for Efficient Computation
In the final analysis an ontology must allow for compu-
tational processing, and consequently issues of computa-
tional efficiency will inevitably arise. For example, using
taxonomic hierarchies both “suggests taxonomic reasoning
and facilitates its execution” (Davis et al., 1993, :27).
Clearly the development of the different flavours of
OWL are a recognition of this fact, but in seeking suffi-
cient speed severe restrictions on the reasoning capacity of
the representation have had to be made. More generally, it
could be noted that since all ontologies depend on a propo-
sitional view of knowledge in order to begin to be compu-
tationally tractable, already a very restricted view of what
it is possible to represent has arisen. The fact that OWL
Full is not guaranteed to be ‘decidable’ unfortunately does
not guarantee it to be sufficiently powerful to represent the
whole gamut of what we can consider to be knowledge.
An Ontology is a Medium of Human Expression All
forms of knowledge representation including ontologies are
both mediums of expression for human being and ways
for us to communicate with machines in order to tell them
about the world. That knowledge representation is a form
of human expression is something frequently forgotten in
the field. In Nirenburg and Wilks (2001), for example,
Nirenburg’s insistence on the possibility of precise unam-
biguous meaning in a ‘representational language’ ignores
this fact. Wilks’ response that the symbols in a represen-
tation are fundamentally language-like essentially reflects
that a representation language is a means of human commu-
nication with all its dynamism, ambiguity and extensibility.
This fact is frequently forgotten in the ontology building
communities (such as the Semantic Web) who vainly be-
lieve that their ontologies will achieve ‘precision’ and ‘ex-
actness’ in the meaning of the terms (classes, concepts, etc.)
in their ontologies.
Figure 3: Pegasus on an Attic vase
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have laid out a series of conditions
or state of affairs concerning the construction of ontolo-
gies. We have argued that the foundations and resources
available for their construction are highly problematic. We
believe that the construct to be achieved has many contra-
dictory requirements both in what it should do and roles
it plays. All these cannot be achieved simultaneously, and
there has to be a degree of compromise in the design and
execution of the construction task. We need to seek to con-
struct a Pegasus and not a Chimera, otherwise it will not fly
(cf. Figure 3).
It is inappropriate to pretend that an ontology can be all
things to all people and this has been the underlying rhetoric
in recent years even if not explicitly stated. In conclusion,
we hope that these points will stimulate discussion and per-
haps more importantly guide the kind of tools and method-
ologies to be developed in the future.
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